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ABSTRACT
Previous studies have suggested that the tax system does not
seriously alter the ranking of utilities of taxpaying families. In
this paper, that question is investigated further. We arrange a
sample of families into four groups: a low tax, low utility group; a
low tax, high utility group; a high tax, low utility group; and a high
tax, high utility group. We define the middle two groups as unfairly
treated (positively or negatively) by the tax system. The results of
this study indicate that 25 percent of our sample is unfairly treated.
The characteristics of those families suggest aspects of the tax
system that are poorly conceived.

Musgrave (1959, p. 160) states that "Perhaps the most widely
accepted principle of equity in taxation is that people in equal
positions should be treated equally." This principle is known as
the principle of horizontal tax equity. Musgrave (1976), Feldstein
(1976), and others point out that horizontal equity has suffered from
neglect in recent studies emphasizing tax efficiency. Part of the
reason for this neglect is that efficiency is much easier to define
and measure than is equity.
As Feldstein notes, if all individuals have the same utility
function, horizontal equity requires simply that taxpayers with the
same consumption bundles (goods and leisure) be taxed equally. The
possibility of diversity of tastes led Feldstein to suggest the
following principle of horizontal equity:
If two individuals would be equally well off (have
the same utility level) in the absence of taxation,
they should also be equally well off if there is a
1
tax.
When preferences differ, a ranking by consumption bundles is no longer
adequate and a utility ordering of households becomes necessary.
Rosen (1978) applied Feldstein's utility definition of horizontal
equity to evaluate the equity of the present tax structure. Assuming
family utility functions of the constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) form, and using 1967 National Longitudinal Sample data for
mature women ages 30-44 years, Rosen estimated family utility function
parameters for the sample of families. Preferences were allowed to
differ by race and by the presence of preschool children. He then
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computed the Spearman rank correlation between utilities before and
after tax and found that the ranking of utilities is not appreciably
altered by the tax system.
This study is also an attempt to explore the horizontal equity of
the tax system but differs from Rosen's in several ways. First, our
concern is not with the effect of the tax system on the utility
rankings of households but with the characteristics of those house-
holds which are treated unfairly by the tax system. Like Rosen, we
estimate the parameters of family utility functions using a cross-
section sample of data, but have a more representative and current
sample. We find that those unfairly advantaged by the tax system tend
to have lower family incomes, to be mostly nonblack, to have more
children, and to be better educated than those families unfairly
disadvantaged by the tax system. Those unfairly disadvantaged by the
tax system are more likely to be two-earner families, rent their
homes, and be non-professionals.
In section I of this paper, we develop our definition of horizontal
equity for this project. Section II is a discussion of the estimation
of the utility levels of our sample of families. In section III, we
identify those households unfairly treated by the tax system and examine
their characteristics. Section IV summarizes the results and their
implications for future research.
I. Horizontal Equity Defined
Our definition of horizontal tax equitv holds that if U. 7U, forM 1 < j
households i and i, then it should be the case that T. — T. where U is
1 < j
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the utility level and T the tax liability of the household. Summing
across households, this implies that if
n
>
n
>
I U. -r nU., then J T. -r nT
.
i=l J i=l J
or, alternatively, if
U T
^yl, then^yl
U T
where U and T are the mean utility and tax levels for all households.
Accordingly, we define a household as unfairly advantaged by the tax
system if U
.
/U > 1 and T
.
/T < 1 and a household as being unfairly
J J
disadvantaged by the tax system if U
.
/U < 1 and T
.
/T > 1.
j J
By our definition, families fall into four categories: lower than
average utility and lower than average taxes, higher than average
utility and lower than average taxes, lower than average utility and
higher than average taxes, and higher than average utility and higher
than average taxes. These possibilities are summarized in Table 1.
Groups I and IV are fairly treated by the tax system (according to our
definition), group II is unfairly advantaged by the tax system, and
group III is unfairly disadvantaged by the tax system.
II. Estimating Utility Levels
In this study, we assume that family utility depends on family
disposable (after-tax) income and the leisure time of the two spouses;
specifically, family preferences are defined by the Cobb-Douglas util-
ity function:
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Table 1: Household Groups
U./U < 1
J
U./U > 1
J
T./T < 1
J
I II
T
. /t" > 1
J
III IV
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(1) U = a 1 J£nY J + a^JlnL, + a £nL„Id Z 1 J Z
whe re Y is family disposable income, L. and L are the leisure hours
d i z
of the husband and wife, and the a's are positive constants that sum
2
to one. We further assume that the family faces two constraints:
(1) family disposable income must be equal to the sum of the husband's
earnings, the wife's earnings, and the nonwork income of the family
minus the family tax liability, and (2) hours worked plus hours of
leisure cannot exceed the number of hours available. In particular,
we assume:
(2) Y J = Y - T(Y-e) - wN 1 + w N + I - T(Y-e)d 1 i Z Z
and
(2b) K - N. + L. J " 1,2
J J
where Y is family money income before tax, T(Y-e) is the family income
tax liability, e is total exemptions and deductions, w is the hourly
wage, N is hours of market work, I is nonwork income (income from
investments, for example), K is the fixed amount of time available,
and the subscripts denote the husband and wife, respectively.
The income tax is a bracket tax on family taxable income, Y - e.
The tax function is given by
(3) T(Y-e) = t(Y-e-Y
.
) + T(Y
. )mm min
where t is the bracket tax rate for the bracket in which Y-e is
observed, Y
.
is the minimum income in that tax bracket, and T(Y
. )
min rain
is the tax payable on that minimum income.
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Maximization of (1) subject Co (2a), (2b), and (3) yields the
following work offer curves for the husband and wife:
I(l-t)+te+tY
.
-T(Y
. ) w
/, \ »T /'i w r min min i z(4a) H
2
= (l-a
2
)K-a
2 [ ^^ ]
-a^
I(l-t)+te+tY
.
-T(Y
.
) w
(4b) N, = (1-aJK-aJ rr^r ^^ " a^—2 J J w„(l-t) w?
which relate hours of work to their wage, their spouse's wage, nonwork
income, and the parameters of the tax system. The importance of the
work offer curves is that they allow us to estimate the parameters of
the utility function, a., a~ , and a^.
Substituting (4a) and (4b) back into the utility function (1)
gives the indirect utility function:
(5) V = fcn[w,(l-t)K + w (l-t)K + I(l-t) + te + tY . - T(Y
. )]12 mm min
- a-Znw (1-t) - a_£nw
2
(l-t) + a £na
+ a„ £na„ + a_£na-
which depends on the family's full income (its total income if both
the husband and wife worked the total time available), the hourly
wages of the husband and wife, the tax parameters, and the parameters
3
of the utility function. The only unknowns in this function are the
parameters of the utility function which we estimate indirectly by
estimating the work offer curves, (4a) and (4b), for a sample of
husband-wife families. Given the estimates of the utility function
parameters, we then compute utility levels for all households.
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The sample of husband-wife families used in this study was drawn
from the 1980 Michigan Survey of Income Dynamics. The data set
contains information on income, wage, hours of work, and family
demographic characteristics as well as tax information on total tax
liability and marginal tax rate. A subset of 1,972 husband-wife
families formed the basis for our study. Families on welfare,
families in which the husband was less than 18 or more than 65 years
of age, and families with negative nonwork income were excluded from
the sample because we felt that behavior of these families would not
be well described by the work-leisure choice model of our study.
To estimate the work-offer curves of husbands and wives we used
restricted least squares. Our estimation model was of the form:
(6a) - ! + 6
l
w_(l-t)K + I(l-t) + te + tY
.
- T(Y
. )
I mm mm
w
1
(l-t)
+ e.
(6b) N = Y
2
Y
w,(l-t)K + I(l-t) + te + tY
.
- T(Y
. )
1 mm mm
w
2
(l-t)
+ e.
where B-. = (l-a~)K, 8, = -a~ , Yn = (l-a^)K, and Y-. = ~a~, and the e's
are disturbance factors. Adding the restrictions that (1+8, )K 8
n
and (1+Y,)K = Yn > where K is taken as 8,760 hours per year, allowed us
A
to identify the parameters of the utility function. To permit
preferences to vary over the population, the work offer curves were
estimated over four subgroups of the sample based on race (black and
nonblack) and education (12 years or less of school and more than 12
years of school).
Since, in the case of some families the wife was not employed and
therefore had no observed wage, and since the wage is measured with
error for wives who were employed, we used the Heckman (1980) method
to obtain a consistent estimate of the potential wages of wives in our
sample. Using the Heckman method, we first estimated (using probit
analysis) the probability that a wife worked outside the home.
Second, we estimated a wage equation through regression analysis,
using the parameters of the probit estimation to adjust for bias in
the estimation of the wage. The wage equation was then used to impute
a wage to all wives in the sample.
The data contained information on the family's marginal tax rate,
t, and total income tax liability, T(Y-e). This information was used
to infer the other tax parameters by solving for the unknown tax para-
meters in equation (3). This gave us:
(7) te + tY . - T(Y
.
) = tY - T(Y-e)
min mm
which we calculated for each household in the sample. In estimating
our model it was assumed that the tax brackets are sufficiently wide
that small changes in income do not cause changes in tax brackets.
This allowed us to disregard nonlinearities in the tax function and
use ordinary least squares to estimate our model. Hausman and others
have developed complicated estimation techniques for dealing with tax
nonlinearities, but for simplicity, we chose to disregard this
to 6problem.
Measurement of the other variables in the study was straight-
forward. Hours of work were measured annually, the husband's wage
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was computed by dividing earnings by hours worked, and nonwork income
was computed as the residual of total family income and the earned
income of the husband and wife. Estimates of the wage equations for
black and nonblack wives appear in Table 2. The columns headed LFP
give the results of the probit estimation of the probability that the
wife participates in the labor force. The wage equation shows that
city size has a positive influence on the wife's wage while the wage
increases with years worked but at a decreasing rate. The education
level of the wife was entered as a series of dummy variables with 17 or
more years the omitted category. The negative coefficients indicate
that those with less than 17 years of education earn a lower wage and
that generally, the lower the education level, the lower the wage. The
insignificant coefficient on the probit lambda variables indicates that
censorship was probably not an important problem in the estimation.
The wage function was used to impute a wage to each woman in the
sample and the work offer curves were estimated using restricted least
squares. The results of the estimation are in Table 3. The slopes,
estimates of the utility function parameters, are all between zero and
one as required by theory.
Table 4 shows the utility parameters implied by the regression
slopes for the four population subgroups. The parameter a., reflects
the family's utility weight on income and was estimated to be higher
for those with more than 12 years of school. This is an expected
result if families view education as an investment in higher future
income. The parameters an and a- are the family utility weights on
the husband's and the wife's leisure, respectively. For nonblacks,
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Table 2
ESTIMATES OF THE WAGE EQUATIONS FOR BLACK AND NONBLACK WIVES
(t ratios in parentheses)
Explanatory Nonbl ack Blac:k
Variables LFP Wage LFP Wage
Constant 2.821 8.585 3.684 7.159
(10.221) (13.540) (5.218) (6.465)
Nonwage income -.484E-5
(-1.254)
—
-.978E-5
(-.674)
—
City size -.0416 1.049 -.121 L.150
(-.559) (5.085) (-.761) (3.934)
Education
0-5 years -.747 -8.049 .718 -5.884
6-9 years -.748 -6.156 -.509 -5.360
10 years -.703 -5.186 -.625 -4.932
11 years -.276 -4.843 -.727 -6.521
12-13 years -.474 -4.935 -.542 -4.321
14 years -.165 -3.887 -.356 -3.627
15 years -.284 -3.285 -1.914 -5.551
16 years -.118 -2.762 .492 -2.573
Years worked .896 .133 .124 .065
(5.149) (3.043) (3.875) (1.061)
Years worked squared -.000983 -.00215 -.00198 -.00173
(-1.649) (-1.448) (-1.983) (-0.852)
Husband's wage -.0182
(-3.520)
—
-.00582
(-.589)
—
Children
1-2 years -.705 — -.482 —
3-5 years -.499 — -.203 —
6-13 years -.140 — -.109 —
—
Age -.0577
(11.448)
—
-.0858
(-6.550)
—
Home ownership .178
(1.785)
.259
(1.608)
Probit Lambda — -.191
(-.730)
—
.459
(1.198)
R .205 .208
-2 times log
likelihood ratio 295.89
Sample size 1507 1014
96.62
465 353
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Table 3
Estimates of the Work Offer Curves
Nonblack Black
Slope R
2
Slope
Education < 12
Husbands
Wives
Education > 12
Husbands
Wives
All
Husbands
Wives
-.249
(-40.71)
-.241
(-58.48)
-.224
(-31.27)
-.224
(-51.26)
-.237
(-50.68)
-.233
(-77.49)
,669
,799
-.387
(-64.04)
.806 -.184
(-25.64)
588 -.384
(-34.55)
,793 -.141
(-10.71)
,630 -.387
(-72.80)
-.172
(-27.16)
.918
.644
.923
.537
.919
.614
—2 2
Notes: R is adjusted R . Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
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Table 4
Utility Parameters by Type of Family
Group
Utility Sample
a
l
a
2
a
3
level size
.510 .249 .241 .971 822
.522 .224 .224 1.199 685
.429 .387 .184 .727 365
.474 .385 .141 .866 100
.525 .260 .215 1.000 1972
Nonblack, Education < 12
Nonblack, Education > 12
Black, Education < 12
Black, Education > 12
All
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our estimates showed little difference in these weights between hus-
bands and wives although black families place a higher weight on the
husband's than on the wife's leisure according to our estimates. The
utility level was calculated on the basis of the estimated weights for
each of the four subgroups and is shown in the table. Since the util-
ity level has only a relative significance, it is shown as a ratio to
the population mean utility level. The group with the highest utility
level is nonblacks with more than 12 years of education while the
group with the lowest utility level is blacks with less than 12 years
of education.
In the next section, we discuss the tax implications of these
results.
V. Tax Treatment of Households
Recall from our earlier definition that groups I and IV are fairly
treated by the tax system in that they either have lower utility than
average and pay lower taxes (group I) or have higher utility than
average and pay higher taxes (group IV). As seen in Table 5, 50%
of our sample falls into group I and 25% into group IV. The remaining
25% falls into groups II and III, those unfairly treated by the tax
system.
Those in group II, 17%, have higher utilities than average and pay
lower taxes. They are unfairly advantaged by the tax system, while
those in group III (8% of the sample) have lower utilities than
average and pay higher taxes. They are the unfairly disadvantaged .
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Table 5
Characteristics of Taxpayer Groups
Giroup
I II III IV
% of households 50% 17% 8% 25%
Family income $18,618 $26,547 $34,204 $46,474
% Nonblack 62% 99% 54% 99%
No. of kids 1.30 1.21 .95 .70
% Homeowners 65% 89% 73% 92%
% with eduction > 12 19% 64% 25% 70%
% Professional 17% 49% 24% 61%
% Mortgage holders 52% 75% 59% 76%
No. earners 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.7
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Unexpectedly, those unfairly advantaged by the tax system (group
II) have a lower average income than those unfairly disadvantaged
(group III). This suggests that lower income families pay lower
taxes, but do not necessarily have lower utilities. What are the
characteristics of the unfairly advantaged group? Besides having
slightly lower incomes than the unfairly disadvantaged, the favored
group II households are almost all nonblack (99%) and tend to have
more children than do the unfairly disadvantaged. They are also more
likely to be homeowners (89% vs. 73% of the unfairly disadvantaged own
houses) and more likely to be mortgage holders (75% as opposed to
59%).
The unfairly disadvantaged, on the other hand, have lower edu-
cation levels, fewer professionals, and more two earner families. As
shown in Table 5, only 25% have more than 12 years of school while 64%
have more than 12 years school in group II. It is also seen that
families in the unfairly disadvantaged group have on average 1.9
workers, the highest of any group.
What explains these differences in characteristics? Part of the
difference may be the higher education and professional occupations
that are characteristic of the favored group. However, this group
also appears to have characteristics that enable them to reduce their
tax liabilities, such as more dependents, home ownership, and mort-
gages. Those in the unfairly disadvantaged group lack these same op-
portunities for reducing tax liability. Accepting our utility measure,
this suggests that perhaps the dependents and homeowner allowances in
the income tax are overly generous.
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IV. Conclusions
We found in our study that a sizeable portion of our sample, 25%,
were unfairly treated by the income tax. This result is contrary to
Rosen's (1978) that there do not seem to be major departures from
horizontal- equity in the income tax. The difference in results may be
due to the use of different measures of horizontal inequity. It may
also be due to the use of different utility functions or data sets.
Our measure of horizontal inequity was simply to identify which
households have higher (lower) utility than average and pay lower
(higher) taxes than average. These households were judged to be
unfairly advantaged (disadvantaged) by the income tax. Our method-
ology did not allow us to identify the extent of the inequity, but did
allow us to specify the characteristics of the unfairly treated
groups. Rosen's measure, on the other hand, allowed him to say
something about the strength of the horizontal inequity (for a par-
ticular, small subsample of the population), but did not allow him to
identify the characteristics of the unfairly treated group.
No conclusions regarding the overall equity of the income tax can
be drawn from either Rosen's or our study. Both studies focussed on
one aspect of equity, horizontal equity, and neglected the much more
difficult area, vertical equity. Likewise, both studies take the
household as the unit of analysis, even though utility is an indi-
vidual concept. Hence, the Cobb-Douglas utility function used in this
study can be thought of as an approximation to the social welfare
function of the family. The question of how individual utilities in
the social welfare function should be weighted is ignored. This, and
-17-
other issues raised earlier provide interesting areas for
future
research.
-18-
FOOTNOTES
1
Feldstein (1976, p. 79).
2
The Cobb-Douglas utility function was selected for its convenient
properties (linear work offer curves and a tractable indirect utility
function) but has the undesirable feature of constraining the elasticity
of substitution between arguments in the utility function to be one.
3
See Varian (1978, p. 94) for the derivation of the indirect util-
ity function in the one person Cobb-Douglas case.
4
The restrictions were derived by eliminating a2 from the 3-coeffi-
cients and a3 from the Y~coef f icients. Total time available was com-
puted by multiplying 24 by 365.
This approach was followed successfully by Wales and Woodland
(1977).
See Hausman (1981).
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